Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels.

Unexpected stimuli induce "error" or "surprise" signals in the brain. The theory of predictive coding promises to explain these observations in terms of Bayesian inference by suggesting that the cortex implements variational inference in a probabilistic graphical model. However, when applied to machine learning tasks, this family of algorithms has yet to perform on par with other variational approaches in high-dimensional, structured inference problems. To address this, we introduce a novel predictive coding algorithm for structured generative models, that we call divide-and-conquer predictive coding (DCPC); it differs from other formulations of predictive coding, as it respects the correlation structure of the generative model and provably performs maximum-likelihood updates of model parameters, all without sacrificing biological plausibility. Empirically, DCPC achieves better numerical performance than competing algorithms and provides accurate inference in a number of problems not previously addressed with predictive coding.

We analyze the dynamics of an algorithm for approximate inference with large Gaussian latent variable models in a student-teacher scenario. To model nontrivial dependencies between the latent variables, we assume random covariance matrices drawn from rotation invariant ensembles. For the case of perfect data-model matching, the knowledge of static order parameters derived from the replica method allows us to obtain efficient algorithmic updates in terms of matrix-vector multiplications with a fixed matrix. Using the dynamical functional approach, we obtain an exact effective stochastic process in the thermodynamic limit for a single node. From this, we obtain closed-form expressions for the rate of the convergence. Analytical results are excellent agreement with simulations of single instances of large models.

Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain level of knowledge about worker models (expertise levels, costs for exerting efforts, etc.). In this paper, we propose a novel inference aided reinforcement mechanism that acquires data sequentially and requires no such prior assumptions. Specifically, we first design a Gibbs sampling augmented Bayesian inference algorithm to estimate workers' labeling strategies from the collected labels at each step. Then we propose a reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) method, building on top of the above estimates, to uncover how workers respond to different payments. RIL dynamically determines the payment without accessing any ground-truth labels. We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels both at each step and in the long run. Empirical results show that our mechanism performs consistently well under both rational and non-fully rational (adaptive learning) worker models. Besides, the payments offered by RIL are more robust and have lower variances compared to existing one-shot mechanisms.

Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain level of knowledge about worker models (expertise levels, costs for exerting efforts, etc.). In this paper, we propose a novel inference aided reinforcement mechanism that acquires data sequentially and requires no such prior assumptions. Specifically, we first design a Gibbs sampling augmented Bayesian inference algorithm to estimate workers' labeling strategies from the collected labels at each step. Then we propose a reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) method, building on top of the above estimates, to uncover how workers respond to different payments. RIL dynamically determines the payment without accessing any ground-truth labels. We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels both at each step and in the long run. Empirical results show that our mechanism performs consistently well under both rational and non-fully rational (adaptive learning) worker models. Besides, the payments offered by RIL are more robust and have lower variances compared to existing one-shot mechanisms.